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California v. LaRue: The Demise
of the "Bottomless" Bar
The United States Supreme Court has sustained the right of
California to regulate entertainment presented in bars and night-
clubs licensed by its Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control.
In California v. LaRue,' the Court held that rules which prohibit
nude dancing on licensed premises are not on their face violative
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. This opinion will be
examined here to determine its implications and effect.
The regulations 2 were issued as a result of the Department's
growing concern over the "bottomless" entertainment offered in
bars and nightclubs which it licensed and the illegal conduct
occurring in and around such establishments. The depth of the
problem was revealed in public hearing held by the Department
in May of 1970.3 Among the witnesses who appeared at these
proceedings were law enforcement officers and investigators, owners
of licensed premises and local city officials. They revealed nu-
merous incidents of sexual conduct between customers and enter-
tainers, a rise in criminal prosecutions for such activity, crime in
the neighborhood of these bars and a decline of other businesses
in the adjacent municipal areas.
Owners of bars and nightclubs affected by the regulations brought
a declaratory judgment suit in the United States District Court
1. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
2. Only the regulations at 4 CAL. ADM. CODE § 143.3 and 4 CAL. ADM.
CODE § 143.4 were challenged. These were summarized by Justice Rehn-
quist at 409 U.S. 111-12 as follows:
(a) The performance of acts, or simulated acts, of "sexual inter-
course, masturbation, sodomy, bestiality, oral copulation, flagel-
lation or any sexual acts which are prohibited by law";(b) The actual or simulated "touching, caressing or fondling on the
breast, buttocks, anus or genitals";(c) The actual or simulated "displaying of the pubic hair, anus,
vulva or genitals";(d) The permitting by a licensee of "any person to remain in or
upon the licensed premises who exposes to public view any
portion of his or her genitals or anus"; and
(e) Te displaying of films or pictures depicting acts a live per-formance of which was prohibited by the regulations quoted
above.
3. Public Hearings of the State Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control held in Sacramento, California on May 12, 13 and 14 of 1970, pages
1-576.
challenging their constitutionality. Two of the three judges im-
paneled to hear the matter upheld the claim of the petitioners that
the rules unconstitutionally abridged the freedom of expression
guaranteed to them by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 4
The District Court majority reasoned that:
S.. the state regulations had to be justified either as a prohibition
of obscenity in accordance with the Rothr line of decisions ...
or else as a regulation of "conduct" having a communicative element
under the standard laid down . . . in United States v. O'Brien.6
Concluding that the regulations would bar some entertainment
which could not be called obscene under the Roth line of cases,
and that the governmental interest being furthered by the regu-
lations did not meet the test laid down in O'Brien, the Court
enjoined the enforcement of the regulations. 7
On review by the Supreme Court, the regulations were upheld
on a different basis. The majority did not believe that the State
was confined to dealing with the problem either within the limits
prescribed by the Court for obscenity or in accordance with the
requirements for dealing with communicative conduct set forth
in United States v. O'Brien.8 The Court determined instead that
the State power to enact the regulations stemmed from the Twenty-
first Amendment 9 and the California Constitution.'0
It is not easy to determine from Justice Rehnquist's language
the view of the majority of the Court of either the scope or mag-
nitude of the State's regulatory power under the Twenty-first
Amendment. In defining this power, the Court employed its
prior decisions involving conflicts between the Twenty-first Amend-
ment and other constitutional provisions as authority. It claimed
that the State was "totally unconfined by traditional Commerce
Clause limitations when it restricts the importation of intoxicants
destined for use, distribution or consumption within its borders,"
according to Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corporation."
4. LaRue v. California, 326 F. Supp. 348 (1971).
5. The test is set forth in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
and A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs Of A Woman Of Pleasure"
v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1965).
6. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
7. 409 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1972).
8. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. "The transportation or importation
into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery
or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is
hereby prohibited."
10. CAL. CONST. art. 20, § 22 (Alcoholic Beverages), amended Nov. 2,
1954 and Nov. 6, 1956: "The department shall have the power in its discre-
tion, to deny, suspend or revoke any specific alcoholic beverage license if
it shall determine for good cause that the granting or continuance of such
license would be contrary to public welfare or morals..
11. 377 U.S. 324, 330 (1964).
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The Court also found that a "classification recognized by the
Twenty-first Amendment cannot be deemed forbidden by the
Fourteenth," quoting from State Board of Equalization v. Young's
Market Company.12 On the other hand, the majority acknowledged
that the Twenty-first Amendment does not supersede all other
provisions of the Constitution. It noted a recent limitation recog-
nized in Wisconsin v. Constantineau13 of the fundamental notice
and hearing requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Court overlooked a limitation which
Justice Rehnquist had proclaimed six months earlier that a "State's
conceded power to license the distribution of intoxicating beverages
did not justify use of that power in a manner that conflicted with
the Equal Protection Clause, ' 14 as mentioned by Justice Marshall in
his dissent in LaRue.
The important issue before the Court in LaRue, however, was the
power of the State under the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate
forms of expression which are traditionally protected by the First
Amendment, for all of the Justices admitted that the regulations
infringed on some free expression. Because there were no prec-
edents for the Court to rely upon to resolve the conflict, the
Court majority turned to other constitutionally permissible regu-
lations of conduct with a communcative element. Justice Rehn-
quist found authority in two post-World War II cases: Hughes
v. Superior Court and Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Com-
pany.'6 In both, injunctions against picketing were approved by
the Court because the activity was "directed to the accomplish-
ment of an end which the State has declared to be illegal."'1 7 :
The LaRue Court implied that the California regulations were
also permissible because the acts proscribed consisted in part at
least of unlawful conduct. Moreover, by describing the movies
and live entertainment offered as "partaking more of gross sexu-
ality than of communication," 8 the Court majority seemingly
12. 299 U.S. 59, 64 (1936).
13. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
14. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 178-79 (1972).
15. Hughes v. Superior Court in and for the County of Contra Costa,
339 U.S. 460 (1950).
16. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
17. 409 U.S. 109, 117 (1972).
18. Id. at 118.
excused its disregard of the special treatment traditionally accorded
First Amendment free expression. 19
Instead, the Court considered the regulations on the basis of
whether the State could rationally conclude that certain sexual
performances and the dispensation of liquor by the drink ought
not to occur simultaneously at establishments which are licensed
by the State. The majority felt that the Department should be
able to prevent the Bacchanalian revelries which the record revealed
were occurring frequently in licensed bars and nightclubs offering
nude entertainment. It regarded the Twenty-first Amendment as
conferring something more than the normal state authority over
public health, welfare and morals. Having isolated the problem
of recurring illegal conduct, the Department could "reason from
the particular to the general. ' 20 As repository of the State's power
under the Twenty-first Amendment, the Department was not con-
fined to requiring self-regulation or self-discipline on the part of
operators of licensed premises. Rather, it had a wide choice of
means to accomplish a permissible end.21 The Department could
therefore employ a "prophylactic solution" 22 preventing the nude
performances on penalty of removal of the licenses of the bar and
nightclub owners, instead of choosing a "less restrictive alternative"
of prescribing exactly how such entertainment could be presented
as suggested by Justice Marshall in his dissent in LaRue.23 The
majority concluded that the regulations were not unconstitutional
on their face, given the rational basis for their enactment and the
added presumption in favor of their validity in the area of liquor
control which the Twenty-first Amendment provides.
Justice Brennan disapproved of the conclusion reached by the
majority. In no way could he find justification for the regulations'
prohibition of protected expression on the basis of the language or
history of the Twenty-first Amendment, no matter how distasteful
the expression. He joined with Justice Marshall in finding the
regulations overbroad. In addition, both Justices Brennan and
Marshall agreed that the State has no right to condition a benefit,
here the license to sell liquor by the drink, on the relinquishment
of First Amendment rights.24
19. McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1182 (1959),
Charles L. Black, Jr., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT, 217-21, The MacMillan
Co. (1960).
20. Assigned Car Cases, 27 U.S. 564, 583 (1927).
21. 384 U.S.35 (1966).
22. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
23. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 132.
24. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
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Justice Marshall in his dissenting remarks made two concesssions
and implied a third. He conceded that state regulation of liquor
is important and is deeply embedded in our history.25 He also
agreed that certain forms of expression are regulable, although he
disagreed with the majority as to the standard to be applied to
permit the control. He implied a balancing process which requires
an overwhelming government interest to tip the scales against the
expressive conduct because of the "preferred" position occupied
by freedom of speech as well as freedom of religion and the press.26
In Justice Marshall's estimation, the State failed to show a com-
pelling governmental purpose, unrelated to mere hostility to the
right being asserted, here the right of free expression, to permit
the regulations abridging that right.27
In contrast to the views of Justices Marshall and Brennan, Justice
Stewart found the regulations justifiable in the context of serving
alcoholic beverages. He emphasized that a State has broad power
under the Twenty-first Amendment to specify the times, places and
circumstances where liquor may be dispensed within its borders.
It is noteworthy that he cited the same authorities as the majority
for his construction of the State's power under the Twenty-first
Amendment. 28 Justice Stewart also found authority for his inter-
pretation of Twenty-first Amendment power in Ziffrin, Incorporated
v. Reeves. 29 In that case, the Court upheld the right of Kentucky
to impose criminal penalties for violation of rigid regulations of
the possession and distribution of liquor.
These regulations of expressive conduct may be justified on the
same basis as those prescribing time, place and manner of political
or religious speech, which have been upheld in prior Court deci-
sions.30 In Hague v. C.I.O., the Court stated that the manner of
exercising the right of free expression "may be regulated in the
interest of all. '' 31 According to Kalven, no one has ever argued
that expression "should be free of the restraints of reasonable
25. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
26. Murdoch v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
27. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
28. State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59
(1936); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corn., 377 U.S. 324
(1964); Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966).
29. 318 U.S. 73 (1943).
30. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536 (1965); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
31. 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939).
. . . rules, and any concessions on this front should not be taken
as relevant to the questions most central to speech theory-questions
of control of content. '3 2  In recent cases, the Court has spoken
more and more of the acceptability of regulation of the context of
expression.3 3 Justice Marshall for the Court upheld such regulation
on the ground that past Court decisions make clear "that reasonable
'time, place and manner' regulations may be necessary to further
significant governmental interests, and are permitted. '34  The
regulation has been held constitutionally permissible "when the
individual's interest in expression, judged in the light of all relevant
factors, is 'miniscule' compared to a particular public interest in
preventing that expression or conduct at that time and place. '3 5
Although free expression is guaranteed by the First Amendment,
expressive conduct may be constitutionally protected at
other places or other times," but prohibited at certain times or
places.3 6
Always the focal point of discussion by the Court in the regulation
is the balancing of the reasons for the control against the diminution
of the exercise of the rights:
In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgement of the rights
is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the effects of
the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preference or beliefs
respecting matters of public convenience may well support regu-
lation directed at other personal activities but be insufficient
to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the
maintenance of democratic institutions. And so, as cases arise,
the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to, weigh the
circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons
advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the
rights.37
In LaRue, the reason for the regulation was to curb the illegal
conduct occurring in and around bars and nightclubs offering
"bottomless" entertainment and to prevent the offensive presen-
tations. Reliable studies demonstrate the increased likelihood of
sexual arousal where liquor is being consumed.38  Evidence of the
32. Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965
Su. CT. REV. 1, 23.
33. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Police Department of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104
(1972); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
34. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972).
35. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 111 (1972).
36. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 120 (1972).
37. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1943).
38. Kinsey, Pomeroy and Martin, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN
MALE (1948); THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNO-
GRAPHY, Sept., 1970 (Bantam Books, 1970); TAsK FORCE REPORT ON DRUNKEN-
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difficulty of curtailing the unlawful activity by police enforcement
was documented in the public hearings.3 9 On balance, the govern-
mental interest seems of sufficient importance to permit the narrow
regulations necessary to eliminate the provocative element of the
entertainment.
Every one of the LaRue Justices considered balancing except
Justice Douglas, who felt that he could not decide the constitu-
tionality of the regulations, absent an application to the challengers.
Justices Brennan and Marshall found that the State's Twenty-
first Amendment power could not balance the scales against First
Amendment rights. The Court majority postponed its balancing
by adopting in its final footnote to the opinion the reservation set
forth in Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter that "specific
future applications .. .may engender concrete problems of consti-
tutional dimension" and that "it will be time enough to consider
any such problems when they arise. '40 Only Justice Stewart
concluded that the scales were weighted in favor of the regulations,
based on the State power to control the time, place and circum-
stances under which alcoholic beverages may be dispensed within
California.
In addition to an actual application of the regulations, the LaRue
opinion leaves other questions unanswered. There is the problem
of complying with Due Process requirements as tailored to guaran-
tee First Amendment protection 41 when the rules are applied. The
issue of whether the Department exceeded the authority granted
to it in the California Constitution by promulgating the regulations
may yet be resolved by the State courts.
However, the approval by the Court of the regulations and the
indicated intention of the Department to enforce them may effec-
tively prevent the orgiastic activities which "bottomless" dancing
in bars and nightclubs serving liquor seems to encourage. The
approach taken by the Department in prohibiting nude dancing
on licensed premises may after all be less harsh than the injunctive
relief against lewd dancing ordered by the California Court of
NESS, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE.
39. LaRue v. California, 326 F. Supp. 348, 360-62 (1971). See also
note 3, supra.
40. 384 U.S. 35, 52 (1966).
41. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
Appeal in People ex rel. Hicks v. Sarong GaIs4 2 and the consequent
abatement proceedings.
The "bottomless" entertainment may still be presented sans the
serving of alcoholic beverages, for as Justice Rehnquist observed
in LaRue "the State has not forbidden these performances across
the board."'4 3 The California Supreme Court decided subsequently
that cities and counties may proscribe nudity in specified public
places,44 justifying its approval of ordinances of this type as rea-
sonable regulation of "the form or manner of the communication."45
Nude dancing in the state has thus been relegated to presentation
in "theaters or similar establishments primarily devoted to theat-
rical performances. '46  The entertainment will now have to be
judged solely on its merits against the new standards laid down by
the United States Supreme Court on June 21, 19734T and finally
accorded the First Amendment considerations which it truly re-
quires.
DouIs M. FELMAN
42. 27 Cal. App. 3d 46, 103 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1972).
43. 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972).
44. Crownover v. Musick, 9 Cal. 3d 405, 509 P.2d 497,. 107 Cal. Rptr.
681 (1973).
45. Id. at 426, 509 P.2d at 511, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
46. Id. at 409-10, 509 P.2d at 499, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
47. Miller v. California, 41 U.S.L.W. 4925.
